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Aid Illusion and Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour
by
Mark McGillivray and Oliver Morrissey
Abstract
Two findings have been common in the literature on the impact of foreign aid on public
sector fiscal behaviour in developing countries. The first is that aid ‘sticks’ to higher
levels of recipient government expenditure, with aggregate expenditure often rising by
more than the value of the aid inflow.  The second is that aid is often associated with
declines in taxation revenue. This paper, using insights from public choice research on
fiscal illusion, provides a number of theoretical scenarios in which the first of these
outcomes arises, but which also allow for simultaneous reductions in taxation. In
contrast to the arguments regarding fungibility in Assessing Aid we present scenarios
where, even assuming that donors and recipients are agreed on how aid should be
allocated to expenditure headings, apparent fungibility will arise. The paper concludes
by suggesting new directions for research on the impact of aid on the public sector in
developing countries.
Outline
1. Introduction
2. Simple Analytics of Aid and Public Sector Behaviour
3. Possible Directions for Future Research
4. Conclusions
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1I INTRODUCTION
Foreign aid remains a principal source of public sector revenue in most developing
countries. Aid inflows were roughly equal in magnitude to taxation, and constituted
approximately half of all public expenditure, in low income countries during the mid- to
late-1990s (World Bank, 1996-99). As most of these inflows go to the public sector of
recipient countries, any understanding of aid’s broader macroeconomic impacts must
start with an understanding of its impact on this sector’s fiscal behaviour. It is both
understandable and appropriate, therefore, that a growing body of empirical research,
from the development economics literature, has looked at the relationship between aid
inflows and various public sector fiscal aggregates, including taxation, and recurrent and
capital expenditure. Although the major focus was on broad government policy affects
the effectiveness of aid, Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998) devoted considerable
attention to the relationship between aid and recipient public expenditure.
A common research finding is for aid to ‘stick’ to increases in total public expenditure
(see Heller, 1975; Pack and Pack, 1993; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; World Bank, 1998;
McGillivray and Ahmed, 1999). Such increases per se are not surprising as donors
typically intend aid to augment this expenditure. World Bank (1998) refers to this as a
‘flypaper effect’, adopting the term used in public choice to describe situations where a
central government grant has the effect of increasing local (or lower tier) government
expenditure by more than the amount of the grant (Barnett, 1993). In the fiscal
federalism literature it is quite common to find evidence that lower tier expenditure does
increase by more than the value of central grants, and most explanations are couched in
terms of fiscal illusion (Dollery and Worthington, 1996). A typical argument invokes the
median voter model: local voter-taxpayers do not fully account for the grant (in
evaluating the cost of providing local services), therefore underestimate the tax-price of
local government-provided goods and vote for, or accept, higher levels of expenditure
(Gemmell et al, 1998). In such models the increased expenditure is associated with
increased taxes.
2Median voter models are not applicable to developing countries receiving aid, and fiscal
illusion arguments are not a helpful way to try and explain why total expenditure can
increase by more than the value of the aid inflow. Rather, we suggest that there may be
forms of aid illusion, in the sense that there are misperceptions regarding how aid should
be accommodated in public expenditure. Furthermore, aid is often associated with
declines or less than proportional increases in taxation and other recurrent revenue (Khan
and Hoshino, 1992; Iqbal, 1997; Pack and Pack, 1993; Ahmed, 1998; McGillivray,
1999; Gang and Khan, 1999).1 Clearly, this is at variance with the normal flypaper effect.
What we seek to explain, then, is why aid can lead to more than proportional increases in
expenditure that are not financed by increased taxes.
We emphasise at the outset that Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and World Bank (1998) are not
specifically concerned with explaining why aid is associated with greater increases in
expenditure but not with increases in tax revenue. Rather, they are concerned with the
broader issue of fungibility – that recipients ‘divert’ aid funds to spending on headings
that the donors did not wish to support (and with related cases where aid appears to be
associated with less than proportional increases in expenditure). That is, they are
concerned with why the ‘wrong’ items of spending increase, or why desired expenditures
do not increase, rather than with total spending; McGillivray and Morrissey (2000)
provide a critical discussion of these concepts of fungibility. Conventional treatments of
fungibility tend to assume, implicitly if not explicitly, that recipient’s intentionally divert
aid to uses other than those intended by the donor. Such fungibility is easily explained if
donors and recipients simply have different preferences regarding the allocation of
public expenditure; ‘malicious’ intent is not required (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000).
We do not here invoke the assumption that donor and recipient preferences differ; they
may do so, but it is not necessary for our arguments. Our aim is to shed light on the
finding that aid leads to greater than proportional increases in total public expenditure in
recipient countries. To do this we provide five theoretical scenarios under which this
                                                
1
. It should be emphasised that this literature is not uncontentious, with many studies and in some
instances the literature as a whole coming under sharp criticism (see, for example, Binh and
McGillivray, 1993; Gang and Khan, 1993, 1994; Khan, 1994; McGillivray, 1994; White, 1994;
McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000).
3outcome arises, using relatively simple, yet incisive, static microeconomic analysis. In
each scenario tax and other recurrent revenue can fall simultaneously. In most scenarios
the above-mentioned finding results from misperceptions or illusions regarding either the
real or nominal value of the aid inflow.  In all but one scenario an illusion occurs. To this
extent the paper builds on research from the public sector economics literature on fiscal
illusion and preference revelation (see Barnett, 1993). In this respect the paper attempts
to forge links between the public choice and development economics literatures.
Fundamentally, however, the paper should be seen as an attempt to open new avenues of
enquiry for research on aid impact. Specifically, we do not require any conflict of
interest between donors and recipients. All we require are possibilities of misperceptions
and/or inefficiencies in the flow of information and monitoring in budgetary processes.
In developing countries, such possibilities are strong probabilities. World Bank (1998)
details the inefficiencies and problems in budgetary management and expenditure
monitoring in low-income countries, and how difficult it is to alleviate these capacity
constraints.
The paper consists of three further sections. Section 2 outlines the above-mentioned
scenarios and points to their outcomes both for expenditure and financing. Section 3
considers possible directions for future research on aid and the public sector in
developing countries. Heavy emphasis is given to more research on the link between aid
and borrowing. Section 4 concludes.
II SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF AID AND PUBLIC SECTOR BEHAVIOUR
Our concern is with the behaviour of a particular spending unit within the public sector
of a given developing country. This might be a ministry, a department or a section within
such an organisation. The most important features distinguishing this unit are that: (i) it
is responsible for allocating a given amount of aid between various spending categories;
and (ii) that the total revenue pool it has at its disposal for allocation, including aid, is
exogenous to the preferences of the officials making decisions on the unit’s expenditure.
The second of these assumptions is consistent with a situation in which a finance
ministry controls revenue flows, allocating given amounts of revenue, including aid, to
4spending units.
2
 We focus on the decisions of the official with ultimate responsibility for
expenditure on specific headings.
3
 Aid is assumed to be fully fungible; that is, the official
treats aid like any other category of revenue and allocates it according to their own
preferences, rather than those of the donor, which may be different.
In this context, there may be no fungibility on behalf of the recipient government. That
is, the finance or planning ministry may allocate aid to expenditure headings exactly as
agreed with donors. Thus, there is no fungibility in the ‘top level’ budget allocations.
Our analysis can be interpreted as what happens to expenditure allocations at lower
levels, such as in the health or education ministries. Alternatively, our analysis could be
viewed as representing allocations to ministries made by the finance ministry, assuming
that revenue is exogenous to the officials making these decisions (the may in a different
part of the ministry from that that agreed aid allocations with donors). As will become
apparent, the outcomes can diverge from intentions. This could be considered as ex post
fungibility, as distinct from the more common notion of intended ex ante fungibility.
We further assume that the official derives utility purely from the quantities of goods
purchased with the revenue at their disposal. For convenience, and in a manner similar to
Feyzioglu et al. (1998), we divide goods into two categories: those which donors intend
the official to purchase with a given aid inflow (X) and all other publicly-provided goods
                                                
2
. A word of clarification regarding aid inflows is warranted. Recent fiscal response studies assume that
the amount of aid allocated by the public sector as a whole in developing countries is endogenous, or a
choice variable from the perspective of this sector (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998; McGillivray and
Ahmed, 1999; France-Rodriguez, 2000). This refers to the amount of aid disbursed by this sector,
which is different to the amount of aid committed by donors. The latter amount is treated by these
studies as exogenous from the perspective of recipients. The aid variable in our treatment of spending
decisions will be the amount of aid disbursed from the finance ministry (or its equivalent) to the
spending unit. This will be endogenous from the perspective of the finance ministry, but not necessarily
from the perspectives of all spending units.
3
. One could focus on the decisions of a median official of this type in order to generalise the findings of
the analysis. Such treatment could be related to public choice approaches based on based on a median
voter. As typically democracy is little developed in the countries being considered, links to median
voter models seem inappropriate.
5(Y). The aid inflow is denoted as A, and comprises grants and loans from official
international donor agencies.
4
  The official’s utility function can be written as:
U = U(X, Y). (1)
The budget constraint prior to receiving aid is
p
x
X + pyY = T (2)
where p
x
 and py are the prices of X and Y, respectively, and T is tax and other recurrent
revenue made available to the official for expenditure on X and Y. The optimising
problem for the official is to maximise (1) subject to (2). Assuming homothetic
preferences, the solution is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 at point z.
                                                
4
. Loans for the purpose of our analysis would be measured in net terms; that is, the amount of the loan
disbursed, less repayments, in the current period.
6)LJXUH&DVK$LGDQGWKH%XGJHW&RQVWUDLQW
Now assume that a donor provides aid and wants to see the inflow allocated entirely to
expenditure on X. Further assume that prices remain constant and the aid is a cash block
grant (it could alternatively be aid in kind, a matching grant, a tied grant or even a loan).
The new budget constraint becomes:
p
x
X + pyY = T + A (3)
and the new optimising solution is z&. Contrary to donor intentions, expenditure on X
does not increase by the value of the aid inflow (i.e. there is fungibility). In this simple
case, total expenditure on X and Y increases by the value of the inflow.
7Under what circumstances might total expenditure increase by an amount greater than
the value of the aid inflow? A possible and quite straightforward means is that the
finance ministry increases total tax and other recurrent revenue and makes this increment
available to the official in response to the aid, topping-up the aid money with matching
funds of its own. That is, the budget constraint would become
                                      p
x
X + pyY = T + A + T
& (4)
where T& is the additional tax revenue. This could be depicted by a further rightward
shift in the budget line, with the new optimum yielding an overall increase in
expenditure which is greater than the value of the aid inflow. But recall that available
evidence often indicates that aid results in decreases in aggregate recurrent revenue.
While this does not necessary imply that reductions in such revenue are spread across all
public sector spending units, it would seem quite unlikely that, against this background,
the unit in question receives a net increase in revenue. Thus it would be unreasonable to
expect that the budget line would lie to the right of dc in Figure 1. Another possibility is
that tax revenue is diverted from another spending area, but this too is inconsistent with
the findings on fungibility (Feyzioglu et al., 1998; World Bank, 1998).
Let us now consider some other, more feasible and otherwise unexplored scenarios. In
most of these scenarios expenditure increases in excess of aid are financed, eventually,
by borrowing from domestic or private international sources. This borrowing is typically
considered financing of the last resort, as it is intended to finance an unanticipated gap
between expenditure and revenue. Such borrowing should not be modeled as a conscious
and deliberate supplement to aid inflows, and thus not as a simple and direct outward
shift in the budget line. In effect, we assume that the borrowing implication is realised in
the period following this static optimisation and is not taken into account (agents are not
forward-looking).
Prior to turning to these scenarios two other points ought to be made. The first is that
there is some empirical evidence of aid leading to increased non-aid borrowing (Franco-
Rodriguez et al., 1998), although this linkage has not received much attention in the
literature. We return to this issue below. Second, in all scenarios expenditure increases in
excess of the aid inflows can still occur even with simultaneous reductions in tax and
8other recurrent revenue. This is not demonstrated explicitly as it should be reasonably
clear from the diagrams presented below. We do not seek to explain why tax revenues
might fall, but our analysis is not compromised if it does.
The first scenario is one in which the donor provides aid in kind, rather than as a cash
grant, as is often the case in practice. Specifically, the donor seeks to increase the
physical amount of some good entering the official’s budget constraint. The constraint
equation then becomes
p
x
(X + XA)+ pyY = T + A (5)
where XA is the aid in-kind and A = p
x
 XA and thus represents the recipient’s financial
valuation of the aid. Note that X + XA must be equal to or greater than XA, and thus the
budget line now contains a horizontal segment. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with the
corresponding budget line being cde.
9Figure 2. Aid in Kind and Misperceptions
Aid may induce a perceived fall in domestic prices. In this context it is useful to think of
the prices of the two publicly-provided goods as defined with respect to a numeraire
private good’s price. The provision of aid in kind may reduce the relative price of X. This
could occur when recipient governments or their agencies sell aid-financed commodities
or services, or those provided in-kind by donors, at less than market prices.
Alternatively, if there is a domestic private market that is quantity constrained there is an
incentive for officials to divert aid goods to that market (e.g. medicines). More generally,
it could occur when aid results in an increase in domestic supply, forcing down market
prices. This does not apply to aid provided in kind if the X-good is not exchanged in
domestic markets. Even if the aid does not affect domestic prices it is possible that the
official wrongly perceives that the domestic price of X falls as a result of the aid receipt.
In this situation the perceived budget constraint becomes
ρχ (X + XA)+ pyY = T + A& (6)
10
where ρχ is the perceived price of X, and A& = ρχ XA.  The corresponding budget line, in
Figure 2, is fgh. With homothetic preferences this results in an increase in expenditure on
X and Y, which exceeds the actual value of the aid inflow. In Figure 2 this is shown by
the move from points z to z&&.  Had the official’s perception of prices been correct, the
corresponding move would have been from z to z&. Given that the misperception results
in a level of expenditure which cannot be supported from the current budget this would
require an appeal for additional finance, most probably by going back to the finance
ministry which would then in turn need to borrow from domestic or other sources.
5
If borrowing is not permitted, the result may be a termination of the budget line such that
some end of period expenditure is not met. Whether this has the effect of meeting
intended donor allocation ex post depends on the timing of expenditure on X and Y. If,
for example, all Y had been provided any shortfall would impact on X. Donors could then
either accept ex post under-spending on X (total spending would increase by the amount
of the aid, but with fungibility) or release new aid for X. In practice, borrowing often
occurs; cash budgets have had only a limited impact in constraining this (Stasavage and
Mayo, 1999).
A second scenario is one in which the recipient is allocated a matching grant, equal to µ,
which subsidises the purchase of X up to a threshold quantity X*. The budget constraint
therefore becomes:
(1-
 
µ)p
x
X + pyY = T    for   X # X* (7)
The value of the aid inflow in this case equals µp
x
X and is set at a maximum of µp
x
X*.
The corresponding budget line is acd in Figure 3. The optimum point now coincides
with c, the corresponding quantity of X, X2, coincides with X* and expenditure increases
by the full amount of the aid allocation (and by the total amount of aid the donor was
willing to provide). Yet budgetary processes can in all countries be chaotic to varying
degrees, especially in developing countries. One reason for this is information
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. Further to the above discussion of actual price changes, it is possible that the price of X could actually
rise as a result of the aid in kind, owing to an increase in demand shown in Figure 2. If not perceived
this would exacerbate the outcome just illustrated.
11
deficiency. It is quite possible that the threshold is not adequately communicated to, or
perceived by, the official. The budget constraint can thus be written as:
                                        (1- µ)p
x
X + pyY = T    for   X # (1+β)X*       (8)
where β is an error parameter which for the purpose of our analysis is assumed to be
greater then zero. Under this scenario the official behaves as if the amount of aid
available is A& = µp
x
(1+ β)X*. The corresponding budget line, shown in Figure 3, is aef.
The perceived optimal outcome, with homothetic preferences, is z&, with expenditure
increasing by more than both the value of the aid inflow and the maximum amount the
donor is willing to provide. But at this point the official is overspending, in that z& lies to
the right of the actual budget line acd, and will have to obtain additional finance (thus,
the aid combined with misperceptions leads to increased borrowing to fund the resulting
deficit).
Figure 3. Matching Grants and Misperceptions
12
A third scenario also relates to a misperception, with the official thinking and acting as if
the aid inflow is not a matching grant but a block grant (perhaps the nature of the grant
was not fully communicated to the official). This is depicted in Figure 4. The actual
budget constraint after the provision of aid is (7), but the perceived constraint is (3). The
corresponding budget lines are acd and ed, respectively. Without the misperception the
official would shift to z&, but instead spends according to z&&. Total expenditure
increases by an amount greater than the aid inflow (and the excess is allocated to Y rather
than X), and the official must obtain additional funds to finance this spending.
Figure 4. Matching Grant Perceived as Block Grant
13
Aid often subsidises the provision of public goods. Donors, from time to time, require
the recipient to recover provision costs by introducing or increasing charges for the good
under consideration (this is often the case for education or health care). Rationales for
this include the ability this affords to provide more goods or use the recovered funds to
improve public sector saving. Let us assume that the donor requires some cost recovery
and that the aid allocation under consideration is a block grant and that the recovered
costs are used to supply more of the good under consideration. This is our fourth
scenario. The budget constraint therefore becomes
(p
x
-c
x
)X + pyY = T + A (9)
where c
x
 is the extent of cost recovery required by the donor, per unit of X sold to the
public. In this situation the budget line, shown in Figure 5, shifts in principle from ab to
cd and the new optimum point is z& and expenditure increases by more than the value of
the aid inflow without additional financing being required. But it is not uncommon for
recipient countries to fail in achieving the extent of cost recovery required by donors.
The budget constraint in this situation, our fifth scenario, can be written as
                              (p
x
-[1-δ]c
x
)X + pyY = T + A&   and    0 # δ < 1 (10)
where δ represents the unanticipated extent of cost recovery failure. The actual budget
line is therefore ce and the corresponding optimum is z&&. But the official has spent
according to cd, expenditure has risen by more than the value of the aid inflow and
additional financing is required. It is worth noting that this scenario does not require
misperceptions. Rather, it captures the possibility of implementation failures for cost
recovery in developing countries. More generally, this represents the problems inherent
in raising tax revenue (or achieving a specified revenue target) in developing countries.
This is a common cause of budget deficits, hence of borrowing
14
Figure 5. Cost Recovery
The various scenarios outlined here all indicate how aid can induce overspending by
recipients (albeit not necessarily on the goods donors may wish to see increased
spending). The problem arises because the spending official may not correctly perceive
the budget constraint. Such misperceptions may arise because the nature of restrictions
on the aid grant are not communicated properly, or because the aid is linked to ambitious
cost recovery (or revenue raising) targets. Donors adopt various means to reduce
fungibility, such as matching grants or aid in kind, but we have shown that these may not
be effective. Such measures may neither ensure the aid is allocated to the intended items
nor that aid does not induce overspending. The implication is not to reduce aid, nor even
15
to attach more conditions to aid. Rather, donors need to ensure that aid is granted in a
transparent simple way, and technical assistance is provided for budgetary planning in
recipient countries.
III.   POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The most obvious direction for future research is that more attention be paid to the link
between aid and other borrowing. In much of the empirical literature on aid and the
public sector, cited above, this variable is ignored. Those studies which do take into
account borrowing estimate a system of simultaneous equations, but do not estimate the
borrowing equation or do not provide sufficient information to infer values of its
parameters. The relevance of scenarios one to three and five above (and related
scenarios) is obviously enhanced if aid can be shown to lead consistently to increases in
borrowing.
But simply reporting estimates of a borrowing equation within the context of existing
models of aid and public sector fiscal behaviour alone would not be sufficient. Existing
empirical studies focus on fiscal aggregates and not the behaviour of individual spending
agencies within the public sector of developing countries. But the approach of this paper
is essentially microeconomic, looking at the behaviour and conditions under which
specific spending agencies operate. Such behaviour is unlikely to be uniform across
agencies, and this approach is therefore justifiable. In particular, the provision of aid in
kind, in block or matching grant form, or with specific conditions attached will clearly
not apply to the public sector as a whole. Moreover, the traditional approach of treating
taxes as endogenous, and recent advances which treat aid as endogenous are quite
appropriate at the aggregate level. But they might not be appropriate at the level of
spending agencies within the public sector. Modifications to the empirical modeling
approach used in the relevant literature need to be considered.
Finally, there is a strong case for more theoretical work prior to the conduct of further
empirical research. As it currently stands the empirical research on aid and the public
sector is to varying degrees ad hoc, so theoretical exploration is justified per se. Such
work could well benefit from the derivation of lessons and directions from the literature
16
on public choice. Indeed, it is ironic that development economics research on aid and the
public sector in developing countries has in general, and in recent years especially,
ignored the public choice literature.
IV.    CONCLUSION
This paper attempted to shed light on the finding, common in empirical research on the
impact of aid on public sector fiscal behaviour, that these inflows lead to greater than
proportional increases in total public expenditure in recipient countries. It provided five
theoretical scenarios under which this outcome arises, using a relatively simple static
microeconomic analysis. In each scenario tax and other recurrent revenue can fall
simultaneously. To this extent the scenarios are consistent with another common finding
of the above-mentioned research, that aid can be associated with reductions in tax and
other recurrent revenue. In most scenarios the above-mentioned finding resulted from
misperceptions or illusions regarding either the real or nominal value of the aid inflow.
To this extent the paper built on research from the public choice approaches to fiscal
illusion and preference revelation, and attempted to forge links between the public
choice and development economics literatures. Fundamentally, however, the paper
attempted to open new avenues of enquiry for research on aid impact. Such avenues
include greater consideration of the determinants of borrowing in developing countries,
as well as consideration of the different forms in which aid is provided, and in general
the conditions under which individual spending agencies, rather than the public sector as
a whole, operate.
In one sense our analysis can be interpreted as implying that targeting aid on specific
uses or expenditure headings may be even more difficult to achieve than suggested in
conventional fungibility literature. In a naïve sense, most writers on fungibility argue
that recipients do not want to spend aid in the way that donors want it spent.
Furthermore, there is a limit to what donors can do about it, as attempts to attach
conditions to the use of aid tend not to be effective. This does not mean there is nothing
that donors can do; as McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) argue, there are various ways
in which donors can limit, albeit not eliminate, fungibility and influence recipient
allocations of aid to expenditure headings. The point made here is that these measures
must be transparent, the intentions must be communicated to the relevant spending
17
officials, and recipients must have effective means of monitoring expenditures and
budgetary processes. As argued in World Bank (1998), many problems stem from weak
public expenditure management in recipient countries. Measures to address this are
essential if aid is to be used more effectively. However, many problems stem from the
actions of donors also. Donors rarely coordinate amongst themselves and employ
different aid administration processes. At the most trivial level, timing of financial years
and classifications of expenditures often differ among donors and between donors and
recipients. This is a source of misperception and misinformation that exacerbates
budgetary inefficiencies in recipient countries, may encourage excess spending and thus
leads to deficits and borrowing. Our principle contribution is to suggest a distinction be
drawn between ex ante fungibility, where donor and recipient spending preferences
differ, and ex post fungibility, where both donors and recipients have less than efficient
processes for allocating and monitoring aid expenditures. The implications for aid policy
and practice are very different in each case.
18
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